

Blurring of the human and the artificial. A conceptual clarification

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1 "Silicon Valley just simulating"

Oswald Wiener (*1935 Wien; cybernetician, avantgardistic writer, musician, linguist etc.):



1 "Silicon Valley just simulating"

Oswald Wiener (*1935 Wien; cybernetician, avantgardist writer, musician, linguist etc.):

- In Silicon Valley, they rush into talking of "learning" and "intelligence". However, all current AI machines don't go beyond "flat formalisms". Though they outclass humans in computation, they are a "surrogate of intelligence" only. They are stupid on a high level. "The heterarchically ordered depth of human rationality cannot be realised in such a way." Humans are incapable of following an algorithm straight. The recognition process is rather a "recursive process", in which data are permanently matched with given knowledge in the background. Thinking is dependent on sensuality.

2 The ontological difference

A complex systems view

1 compares the human and the artificial so as to explore what **differs** on the basis of what they have **in common**

2 and shows how **fallacies in theorising** the human and the artificial in relation to each other can be **avoided**

2.1 A complex systems comparison: "man"/society vs. machine

"Man"/society is the product of

- **physical**,
- **biotic** and
- **social** evolution.

Machine is the product of "man"/society.

2.1 A complex systems comparison: "man"/society vs. machine (1/4)

	"Man"/society	machine
in physical respect	<p>as an <i>agens</i>*:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• is able to organise itself, that is, to build up its own order by using free energy and dissipating used-up energy;• is made up of elements that produce organisational relations that constrain and enable synergy effects and it can take part in meta-/suprasystems;• works on the basis of less-than-strict-determinacy yielding emergence and contingency...	<p>as a <i>patients</i>*:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• cannot self-organise;• is made up of moduls that are connected in a mechanical way;• is strictly deterministic, not emergent nor contingent...

2.1 A complex systems comparison: "man"/society vs. machine (2/4)

	"Man"/society	machine
in biotic respect	<p>as an autonomous agent:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• is able to maintain its organisational relations by the active provision of free energy;• can make choices according to its embodiment, its embedding in its natural environment and the network of conspecifics;• tries to control other systems by catching up with their complexity...	<p>as an heteronomous mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• cannot maintain itself;• cannot choose;• cannot catch up with complexity, is under control of the organism...

2.1 A complex systems comparison: "man"/society vs. machine (3/4)

	"Man"/society	machine
in social respect (1)	<p>as an actor (a social agent):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• is, in essence, the ensemble of the social relations* that emerged from a change in co-operation of its animal ancestors;• is element of social systems that provide the commons as social synergy effects;• constitutes social agency (action, interaction and co-action with other actors) that reproduces and transforms the social structure (social relations) that, in turn, enables and constrains social agency;	<p>as artefact:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• is constructed;• pertains to the commons;• does not act itself but supports action, inter- and co-action, is not directly causative;

2.1 A complex systems comparison: "man"/society vs. machine (4/4)

	"Man"/society	machine
in social respect (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• is the driving force of social evolution, including the evolution of culture, polity, economy, ecology, technology;• can attempt to set off the transition into actuality of an option of choice out of the field of possibilities;• can reflect upon the social relations so that „I“ and „thou“ become „me“ and „thee“ by mediation of „us“ as the third that is „we“ as reflected from „me“ and „thee“ ...	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• is driven by social evolution;• does not directly trigger emergence;• cannot reflect relationally...

2.2 A complex systems review: "man"/society-machine models

The relationship of "man"/society and the machine is modelled
– either on the basis of the **identity**,
– or the **difference**,
– or the **identity and difference** of their degrees of complexity.

"Edmond de Belamy",
computer print,
 $\min G \max D \times [\log(D(x))] +$
 $z [\log(1 - D(G(z)))];$
sold for 432.500 \$ at Christie's in
2018



2.2.1 Identity of "man"/society and machine

"Man"/society-machine models			
conflation	monism: "man"/society and mechanism are identical inasmuch as they share the same degree of complexity	reduction	technomorphism: any "man"/society is as complex as a mechanism
		projection	anthropomorphism: any mechanism is as complex as "man"/society

2.2.1.1 Identity by reduction: "man"/society is a machine

- (1) The societal system is reduced to the **individual actor**; a fallacy of *horizontal reduction* of complexity (from the system to its elements);
- (2) The individual actor as a social being is reduced to the **human body** as living system; a fallacy of *biologism*, which is a vertical reduction from social complexity (on a higher level) to a mere biotic complexity (on a lower level);
- (3) The human body is reduced to its **physical substrate**; a fallacy of *physicalism*, of reduction from biotic complexity to mere physical complexity;
- (4) The physical substrate of the human body is reduced to a **mechanism**; a fallacy of *strict determinism*, of reduction from self-organising systems at all to entities that have no capacity to self-organise.

Examples: Materialism in education of computer and cognitive scientists ("If I can model it with engineering or natural science methods, I understand it")

2.2.1.2 Identity by projection: any machine is like "man"/society

- (1) The essential features of the **social system** are projected onto the individual actor;
- (2) The essential features of the **individual actor** as a social being are projected onto the human body as living system;
- (3) The essential features of the **human body** are projected onto its physical substrate;
- (4) The essential features of the **physical substrate** of the human body are projected onto any mechanism, be it natural or artificial.

Examples: Info-Computationalism ("The universe is a natural computer")*, panpsychism ("The universe is ensouled"), Gaia hypothesis ("The planet is a living organism")**

2.2.2 Difference of "man"/society and machine

"Man"/society-machine models		
disjunction	<p>dualism: "man"/society and mechanisms are genuine entities of different or same complexity</p>	<p>anthropocentrism: "man"/society has been and will be of exceptional complexity</p>
		<p>technocentrism: a mechanism can be higher complex than current "man"/society</p>
		<p>"man"/society-machine interactivism: "man"/society and mechanisms are different entities but interact as if of same degree of complexity</p>

2.2.2.1 Difference by anthropocentrism: "man"/society superiority

Examples: Idealism in theological positions, humanities ("Humans are sentient – robots are corpses")*

2.2.2.2 Difference by technocentrism: machine superiority

Examples: Technophilia in Trans- and Posthumanism ("Technology will outperform more and more human functions"), Singularitarianism

2.2.2.3 Difference by "man"/society–machine interactivism: indifference


Examples: Flat ontologies in Actor-Network-Theory ("actants")*,
Sociomaterialism ("intra-action")**

2.2.3 Identity and difference of "man"/society and machine

	"Man"/society-machine models	
integration	dialectic: "man"/society and mechanisms are evolutionary products of nested complexities	techno-social systemism: techno-social systems are social systems emergent from "man"/society as soon as mechanisms are functionalised by which the performance of the (techno-)social systems is improved to such an extent that they transform into another system of the same kind


2.2.3 Identity and difference of "man"/society and machine

Social system




2.2.3 Identity and difference of "man"/society and machine

Technosocial system




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
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
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
2.2.3 Identity and difference of "man"/society and machine

Technosocial system




2.2.3 Identity and difference of "man"/society and machine

Technosocial system



3 The ethical consequence



(Photos from mobilegeeks.de; Boeing/Craig Larsen)

3 The ethical consequence (1/5)

“**[T]he uncritically applied anthropomorphistic approach toward A/IS**”
“**erroneously blurs the distinction between moral agents and moral patients**” (i.e. subjects). In systems terms, it as a distinction between
“**natural self-organizing systems and artificial, non-self-organizing devices**”. Such “devices cannot, by definition, become autonomous in the sense that humans or living beings are autonomous”. The **terminology used is “both dangerous and misleading in that it encourages anthropomorphistic expectations of machines by human beings when designing and interacting with A/IS.”** It is **only metaphoric**, since “[t]his is how language works and how humans try to understand their natural and artificial environment.” But “the difference must be maintained, especially as A/IS begins to resemble human beings more closely”.

3 The ethical consequence (2/5)

Eight rules of Klaus Kornwachs*

- 1. Never use a decision-making system that substitutes your own decision.** Even robots must not be used in decision-making intent.
- 2. *Nihil Nocere*** – don't tolerate any harm to users.
- 3. User rights break producer rights.**
- 4. Do not build pseudo-autonomous systems that cannot be turned off.**
Fully autonomous systems should not be allowed.

3 The ethical consequence (3/5)

5. **The production of self-conscious, autonomously acting robots (if possible)* is prohibited** (analogous to the chimera ban and human cloning ban in genetic engineering).
6. **Do not fake a machine as a human subject** as a counterpart. A machine must remain machine, imitation and simulation must be always recognizable. It must always be clear to all people involved in human-machine communication that a machine communication partner is a machine.

3 The ethical consequence (4/5)

- 7. If you do not know the question and the purpose of the question, you cannot handle the system response and understand the behavior of a robot. The context must always be communicated.**
- 8. Anyone who invents, who produces, operates or disposes of technology has interests. These interests must be disclosed honestly.**

3 The ethical consequence (5/5)

Conclusion

Neither humans nor artificial devices will become smart as long as the focus is on the **individual** in a trans-/posthumanistic perspective that detracts from the real task:

the preparation of humanity for a third step in **societal** evolution – a self-organised noogenesis* – to be accomplished through a meta-/suprasystem transition** to a **global sustainable information society**.

Thank you!
